Italy: the uneasy co-exsistence of different social models by M. Regini & S. Colombo
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #169 (2009) 
 
Italy: the uneasy co-existence of different social models* 
by 
 
Marino Regini, Professor (marino.regini@unimi.it) 
and 
Sabrina Colombo, Assistant Professor (sabrina.colombo@unimi.it) 
Department of Labor and Welfare Studies 
University of Milan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The “European social model” includes a welfare regime with generous social expenditure; high 
employment or income protection; a well-developed system of industrial relations; and involve-
ment of social partners in policymaking. Within the Italian social model, however, one can find 
three major dividing lines. The first one stems from the coexistence of different models in differ-
ent areas of the country. Second, an occupation-based principle in pensions and in unemploy-
ment benefits coexists with a citizenship-based one in health and education. Finally, core workers 
enjoy high job and income security, whereas outsiders are highly dependent on the market. These 
three dividing lines substantially endanger the legitimacy and social acceptance of the Italian 
social model: each of them profoundly affects the perceptions of workers and citizens, leading to 
widespread criticism of even those aspects that clearly benefit them and, at the same time, to 
fierce opposition to the several attempts at reforming it. 
                                                           
*Paper presented at the conference on The Nordic Model: Solution for Continental Europe’s 
Problems? Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, May 9-10, 
2008. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the post-World-War-II period, European political and intellectual élites largely 
shared the belief that market economies could not and should not be left entirely to the 
market, but rather follow some sort of “social model.” This was true for both Nordic so-
cial democracies and continental Christian-Democratic and conservative élites. Though 
in different ways, they all regarded the market as the most efficient mechanism for re-
source allocation, but at the same time as producing deep inequalities in income distri-
bution, work chances and access to social protection, a mechanism, therefore, that 
needed to be combined with other instruments which could insure social justice, be they 
state policies, family and community networks, or interest associations. 
 
However, the concept of a European social model of economic management and 
development has often remained vague, more normatively oriented than empirically 
specified; a rather poor blanket stretched in many directions to cover widely different 
beds. In this paper, by “European social model” we mean a specific configuration of the 
following features: 
 
a) a type of welfare regime with relatively generous social expendi–
ture and mostly non-means-tested provision of social services and wel-
fare benefits; 
b) labor-market regulation that combines companies’ quest for flexi-
bility with high employment and/or income protection; 
c) a well-developed and institutionalized system of industrial rela-
tions based on inclusive and mutually recognized interest associations, as 
well as on coordinated collective bargaining; 
d) a style of economic and social policymaking based on consultation 
and involvement of social partners, either informally or in formal tripar-
tite concertation. 
 
However, any comparative analysis of Western European economies immediate-
ly shows major differences among them along all four dimensions of the European so-
cial model identified above, and questions the usefulness of this categorization. The 
Nordic model does not have much in common with the Mediterranean one, but even 
Modell Deutschland exhibits deep differences from the next-door “Dutch miracle.” 
 
In this paper we try to show that, insofar as Italy is concerned, it is even difficult 
to clearly identify an “Italian social model.” This is because, beneath the stylized account 
of that model commonly offered, one can find at least three major dividing lines, which 
make that account either a partial or an “average” illustration of the rather different phe-
nomena characterizing that model.  
 
The first and most obvious dividing line stems from the coexistence of different 
social models, which exhibit varying degrees of welfare standards, divergent objectives 
of territorial social pacts, wide variation in rates of unemployment and in actual labor-
market regulation, different rates of poverty, etc., in different areas of the country. 
 
The second, less well-known dividing line stems from the coexistence of quite 
different principles in the various national welfare programs: a particularistic, 
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occupation-based principle in pensions and unemployment benefits vs. a universalistic, 
citizenship-based one in the provision of health and education. 
 
Finally, even less noticed outside Italy is that different features of its social model 
apply to different categories of workers/citizens. Namely, high job and income security 
for core workers and their families (the insiders) vs. relatively high dependence on the 
market and on residual forms of welfare for the others (the outsiders). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we will briefly sketch what is commonly 
regarded as the typical Italian configuration of the four features mentioned above. Sec-
ond, we will examine the three dividing lines that make this stylized account the end-
result of internally different features: at times an “average” description of widely vary-
ing phenomena, at others a partial one, which focuses on some parts of the system while 
neglecting the others. We will present some data, where available, to support this hypo-
thesis and we will briefly set the main lines of the argument, which would require far 
more space for full development. 
 
A short conclusion will focus on the idea that these internal differences, or divid-
ing lines, do not easily, even less happily, coexist. Rather, they are a source of tensions 
and constant instability for the Italian social model. Our basic argument here is that the 
three dividing lines substantially endanger the legitimacy and social acceptance of the 
Italian social model. In fact, each of them profoundly affects the perceptions of workers 
and citizens, leading to widespread criticism of even those aspects that clearly benefit 
them and, at the same time and somewhat paradoxically, to fierce opposition to the sev-
eral attempts at reforming the “Italian model.”  
 
2. THE ITALIAN SOCIAL MODEL 
 
In what follows we will briefly outline two major features of the Italian social 
model: 1) its welfare regime; 2) the mechanisms regulating the labor market and the 
involvement of interest associations in policymaking. 
 
2.1. The welfare regime 
 
In many respects, the Italian welfare regime follows the tradition of continental 
Europe. From its very beginnings it adopted the Bismarckian model: a selective type of 
welfare, created to protect workers against the negative effects of capitalism. The 
political-institutional conditions of the postwar period reinforced this Bismarckian 
stamp on the Italian welfare system. Alongside the principles of the centrality of work 
and the solidarity of the socio-occupational categories, there was the Catholic vision of 
the centrality of the family and the subsidiary role of the other institutions (such as the 
State) that supported it. In short, following the Esping-Andersen typology (1999), Italy is 
usually placed among those countries of continental Europe that have a “corporatist-
conservative” welfare regime based on the support of the family and, in particular, the 
male “breadwinner” – whose coverage depends on the socio-occupational category he 
belongs to, and consequently results in a high degree of institutional fragmentation of 
the system (Ferrera, 1996).  
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Starting from the post-WWII period, interventions in the Italian welfare system 
can be divided into three stages (Jessoula and Alti, 2008). 
 
• From the 1950s to the 1970s. At the height of the Fordist era and of Keynes-
ian policies, important welfare reforms were introduced. The health and pension sys-
tems were expanded during the 1970s with the establishment of a National Health Ser-
vice financed by taxes, and the introduction of a seniority pension which made it possi-
ble to retire after a certain number of yearly contributions, irrespective of age. Measures 
were also introduced to provide fragmented, minimum unemployment benefits depend-
ing on the occupational category, consisting of modest unemployment allowances or 
programs to replace the salary in case of total or partial reduction in working hours, the 
so-called Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, or Redundancy Fund). Finally, benefits to support 
the family through monetary transfers, though not widespread since they were con-
sidered as supplements to the salary, were introduced and financed by the contributions 
of dependent workers.  
 
• From the late 1970s through the early 1990s. The period of stagflation, unem-
ployment and high public debt led to some interventions aimed at reducing welfare 
expenditure (e.g., control mechanisms for disability pensions). Training contracts for 
young people were introduced in 1984, with tax relief for companies that hired them for 
two years and provided on-the-job or off-the-job training. On the other hand, more ex-
pansionary programs were also introduced. The most important were: early retirement 
schemes in 1981; more generous methods to calculate pension benefits; increases in so-
cial contributions paid by employers (that increased labor costs). 
 
• From the 1990s onwards. At the beginning of the 1990s the Italian welfare 
system had reached a certain maturity, in line with the other European countries. How-
ever, in those years, the challenges facing Italian governments increased: an economic 
crisis, a deep political crisis, complying with European constraints regarding the spend-
ing/public debt ratio in order to enter the European Monetary System. Throughout the 
1990s, state interventions were mostly aimed at labor policies: introduction of temporary 
employment in 1997; reform of the job placement system, entailing the end of public 
monopoly and the entry of private companies; the first active policy measures to allow 
weaker social groups to enter the labor market; and the reform of the pension system 
(1995), which introduced regulations regarding eligibility and criteria that were not as 
generous as before. On the other hand, during the 1990s even family benefits were re-
formed (in addition to attempting to introduce a minimum income) and more generous-
ly granted on the basis of “socioeconomic indexes.” In more recent years, labor policies 
and pensions continue to be in the forefront. 
 
Overall, we note that the amount of social spending as a percentage of GDP has 
been rather limited in Italy (see Table 1 in Appendix, p. 17) and, in the early 1980s, was 
still below the European average – despite the increase in welfare measures between the 
1950s and the 1970s, especially concerning pensions and health care. During the 1980s, 
however, it increased substantially, to reach the EU-15 average in the early 1990s. At the 
end of the 1990s social spending once again fell below the European average.  
 
Nevertheless, for historical reasons, Italy has the highest public debt of the EU 
member states (see Table 2, p. 17). This makes the problem of reducing public spending 
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much more macroscopic and urgent than in the other EU countries and maintaining the 
levels of welfare provision a very controversial and delicate issue. 
 
As to the tax burden, the Italian social model is characterized by a tax rate that is 
a few percentage points higher than the European average. Table 3 (p. 17) shows the tax 
burden as a percentage of GDP. Since both direct and indirect taxes as a percentage of 
GDP are higher than the European average, labor costs tend to be higher. Table 3 also 
shows the implicit tax rate on employed labor calculated by Eurostat.1 It is quite evident 
that even in this case, the implicit tax rate tends to be higher than the European average. 
Italy is one of the countries that penalizes employed labor the most. This is caused not so 
much by the tax wedge – a recent study of the manufacturing sector (Capparucci, Ghig-
noni, Naddeo, 2005) demonstrated that in Italy the tax wedge for different categories of 
workers employed in the manufacturing sector does not differ much from other Euro-
pean countries – but by the incidence of such taxes on production factors as the Regional 
Tax on productive activities (introduced at the end of the 1990s).   
 
Moreover, Table 4 (p. 18) shows that, in the last few years, the main indicators of 
economic performance have recorded rather low values. We see that in Italy production 
is stagnant, there has been a gradual loss of market share abroad, as well as a drop in in-
vestments and family consumer spending. Nevertheless, the prospect of lowering taxes 
on employed labor would have a negative impact on those measures that finance wel-
fare institutions. As we have shown, in Italy social spending is below the European aver-
age; further cuts motivated by the need to reduce labor costs would penalize Italian 
workers compared to the other European countries.   
 
2.2. Regulatory mechanisms and the involvement of interest associations in policy-
making  
 
As far as the other features of the European social model are concerned, the stan-
dard account of the Italian model usually focuses on the following: a) high labor-market 
rigidity; b) high influence of medium-strong unions and relatively coordinated wage 
bargaining; and c) diffusion of social pacts as methods for negotiated policymaking. 
 
Actually, until the late 1960s, policymaking in Italy was characterized by unilat-
eral initiatives of governments and by external pressures from social partners. Although 
the Italian economic situation required intervention in policies, the social partners had 
not developed structures and strategies suitable to directly affect policymaking. 
 
On the one hand, up to the mid-1970s, governments were able to curb inflation 
by means of unilateral monetary and fiscal measures. On the other, trade-union confed-
erations had little desire, and even less ability, to build consensus on wage restraint, not 
                                                
1“The implicit tax rate (ITR) on employed labor is defined as the sum of all direct and indirect taxes and 
employees' and employers' social contributions levied on employed labor income divided by the total 
compensation of employees working in the economic territory increased by taxes on wage bill and pay-
roll. The ITR on labor is calculated for employed labor only (so excluding the tax burden falling on social 
transfers, including pensions). The implicit tax rate on labor should be seen as a summary measure that 
approximates an average effective tax burden on labor income in the economy. “ (Eurostat, Structures of 
the taxation systems in the European Union) 
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least because of their low levels of workplace representation. Although from the first 
half of the 1970s onwards the unions were able to increase their membership (see Table 
5, p. 18), their strategy of action was still to exert external influence on decision-making 
processes by means of collective mobilization. However, by the end of that decade, the 
economic crisis in Italy generated very high rates of inflation and rising unemployment, 
creating conditions that made concerted agreements on economic policy necessary. 
 
Inflationary pressures obliged governments to adopt measures contrary to those 
which they had imposed unilaterally (monetary and fiscal policies) in previous years 
(Salvati, 2001). Until the end of the 1970s, Italian governments were formed by unstable 
majorities consisting mainly of “center-left-oriented” party coalitions with strong affilia-
tions with the unions. Hence it became increasingly necessary for them to negotiate eco-
nomic policy measures – especially incomes policies – with the social partners. Both em-
ployers’ associations and trade unions regarded such political negotiation as a second-
best solution, but neither could pursue their interests the way they used to (for the un-
ions, wage improvements by collective bargaining; for employers, by transferring high 
labor costs onto price increases). It should be noted that, in Italy, the unions are divided 
along political lines and often competitive but, until 2002, they found ways to overcome 
their divisions and to make concertation possible. 
 
Thus began the period of “political exchange”: “bargained laws” during the 
1970s (in 1977 a law on the restructuring of firms; in 1978 the law on vocational training; 
in 1979 a law to support youth employment) and tripartite agreements during the early 
1980s (on incomes policies in 1983 and on labor-market flexibility in 1984). After that 
period, tripartite negotiation entered a crisis until the early 1990s. 
 
The distribution of social pacts over time shows that the first experiences in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s were disappointing and led the actors to abandon tripartite 
concertation for about a decade (see Table 6, p. 19). The two tripartite agreements of 1992 
and 1993, however, were generally greeted as very successful in reaching their goals, as 
well as having the latent function of institutionalizing the highly voluntarist system of 
industrial relations in Italy. This very success of the method of concertation accounts for 
all the actors’ greater willingness to rely on it as a consensual and effective mode of gov-
ernance.  
 
In 1995, 1996 and 1998 social pacts were tried again in different policy areas. But 
their effectiveness declined, and they slowly turned into little more than symbolic ac-
tion, indicating all the actors’ willingness to cooperate towards achieving the public 
good – until even their symbolic value was seriously undermined by the breakdown of 
the unions’ unity in the 2002 Pact.  
 
The 2002 Pact and the ensuing reform of the labor market led to a period of crisis 
of concertation (partly due to the end of trade union unity and partly to the unwilling-
ness of the center-right government to involve the social partners). Following the victory 
of the center-left coalition in 2006 elections, the dialogue between the social partners re-
sumed and, given the country’s socioeconomic crisis, they immediately pressed for a 
new social pact. The “Pact for Welfare” finally signed in 2007 has been termed a “new 
generation pact,” mainly for the issues that were the subject of the negotiation. In fact, 
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the agenda of concertation for the first time included the management of flexibility and 
the reform of welfare in terms of greater inclusion.  
 
The negotiation of incomes policy was incremental until the July 1993 Pact on the 
structure of collective bargaining. Studies on the impact of the 1993 pact show a relative 
wage drift. This means that wage negotiation at the company level sometimes tends to 
overlap with the national, industry-wide one. In Italy company-level bargaining has 
mainly pay components, but the “fixed” ones (or the traditional ones, i.e., the practices 
followed prior to the July 1993 agreement) have diminished over time, being replaced by 
bonuses based on company performance. The wage drift is thus relatively small and in 
2007 not present at all (De Novellis, Origo, Vignocchi, 2002; CNEL, 2004; Bordogna, Mar-
chetti, 2002; Bordogna, 1997; CNEL, 2007; Rossi, Sestito, 2000; Casadio, Lamelas, Rodano, 
2004). 
 
As to labor-market policies, in the early 1990s they were limited to generic 
pledges, while they came to the forefront with the 1996 Pact for Employment, the 2002 
Pact for Italy, and the 2007 Pact for Welfare. From this point of view, trade unions and 
their role in regulating the economy acquired a certain importance vis-à-vis the chal-
lenges that European economies face regarding the need for greater flexibility in the 
labor market (Regini, 2000).  
 
In 1999, the OECD considered the Italian labor market one of the most rigid in 
Europe. In 2004, the OECD revised its estimate – because its analysis of the costs of dis-
missing a worker was based on a serious calculation mistake – and Italy is now consid-
ered to be one of the countries with intermediate rigidity. The last column of Table 7 (p. 
19) shows the “overall EPL (Employment Protection Legislation) index” of the main 
European countries as a synthetic measure of rigidity of their labor markets. In 2003, 
Italy had an intermediate level of rigidity as far as the regulation of temporary em-
ployment is concerned. However, the index remains rather high if we consider the meas-
ures regulating the dismissal of workers.   
 
If we observe the trend in the regulation/deregulation of the Italian labor mar-
ket, we see that, over time, interventions regarding dismissals (including the shock ab-
sorbers and active policy measures) are virtually non-existent. One sees, however, nu-
merous interventions that aimed to regulate entrance into the labor market (with in-
creasingly less stringent restrictions) that culminated with the Law of 2003 that further 
expanded the scope of atypical work.     
 
However, what characterizes these interventions aimed at those first entering the 
labor market is the relative consensus of the trade unions, since most of these interven-
tions were negotiated between the social partners (either through national tripartite con-
certation or bilateral collective bargaining). The exception is Law 30 of 2003 that put into 
effect the social pact of 2002. In this case, the largest trade union confederation (CGIL) not 
only refused to sign the pact but also called a series of strikes in the following months. 
Instead, the last social pact that was signed (in 2007) represented an intervention aimed 
at offsettting the effects of the increased flexibility in labor-market entry. For the time be-
ing, the deregulation of the Italian labor market seems to apply mainly to those first en-
tering the labor market and has not just been the result of unilateral interventions by 
governments.   
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The role of trade unions in socioeconomic regulation now stands at an important 
crossroads. Table 5 (p. 18) clearly shows that, since the 1980s, there has been a decline in 
trade union membership in Europe. This is mainly due to changes in the labor market 
(expansion of the tertiary sector, spread of fixed-term contracts, higher unemployment, 
etc.). The decrease in the number of unionized workers has generally weakened trade 
unions’ bargaining power and has made them more dependent on the decisions and 
support of other actors in the political and industrial arena (Visser, 2005). Compared to 
the past, however, the differences are less noticeable in Italy than in other European 
countries: in 2003, 2004 and 2005, union membership in Italy was still about 33 percent 
(Giacinto, 2007). Trade unions continue to be rather strong and deeply rooted in the 
workplace and continue, therefore, to be an important component of the overall Italian 
social model.  
 
3. THE MAIN DIVIDING LINES WITHIN THE ITALIAN SOCIAL MODEL 
 
The social model described in the previous pages represents a kind of “national 
average.” However, as pointed out in the Introduction, in Italy there are various types of 
“deviations from the average.”  
 
3.1. The territorial differences: how many social models? 
 
The most obvious and studied internal dividing line in Italy is the territorial one. 
As far as the theme of our paper is concerned, we may highlight a coexistence of differ-
ent social models in different areas of the country that show varying degrees of welfare 
standards, divergent objectives of territorial social pacts, wide variation in unemploy-
ment rates and actual labor market regulation, different rates of poverty, etc. 
 
Although the Italian welfare regime is considered to follow the traditions of the 
“conservative-corporative” model, some scholars have pointed out that it has some spe-
cific features that make it resemble the welfare regimes of other Mediterranean countries 
(Spain, Greece, Portugal) (Paci, 1987; Ferrera, 1996). Thus, it has been observed that in 
Italy the standards of welfare are not homogeneous, nor are the types of social coverage. 
This first section will describe the main territorial differences that have historically been 
the socioeconomic dividing line. The next section will describe the differences in types of 
social coverage.    
 
The first territorial dividing line can be found in the different items of welfare ex-
penditure. Table 8 (p. 19) shows Italian social expenditure in 2005 divided into three 
main items. The largest amount is spent on social security (to cover pensions, unemploy-
ment benefits, occupational accidents, maternity leave and sick leave), with over 80 per-
cent to cover pensions (Istat, 2007). The National Health Service represents the second 
item of welfare expenditure.   
 
In these two welfare programs, there are notable differences between North and 
South. Both types of program show that public resources are sometimes used for private 
purposes because of a double deficit of state authority (Ferrera, 1996, 2000) – namely, a 
low degree of institutional control over the distribution of welfare expenditure and over 
the recipients – and that this is particularly significant in the South.   
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The national health system is managed by regional governments, which control 
the local health agencies and set the level of user charges, although subject to some con-
trol of the Health Ministry. Differences between regions in wealth levels, political coali-
tions in office and competence of the political élite brought to very different outcomes, 
with the Southern regions often charged for malasanità – health inefficiency or corrup-
tion. 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of health expenditure concerns the mixture 
of public and private. In Italy, numerous health services (diagnostic and therapeutic) are 
outsourced to private hospitals and the largest amount of such costs is spent in the 
South. This mixture has often led to a considerable waste of public funds and ineffi-
ciency (factors that are often associated with the way the National Health Service is ad-
ministered in the South), as well as forms of outsourcing that are not transparent and 
even defined as “forms of collusive manipulation between private suppliers and public 
administrators” (Ferrera 1996: 80).  
 
On the other hand, if we observe the total and per capita amount of health 
spending by geographic area (see Table 9, p. 20), the differences between North and 
South seem to be less marked. Since the 1970s (when the National Health Service was set 
up), health spending across the national territory has become more balanced. Neverthe-
less, there are still considerable differences in terms of the health services actually ob-
tained considering the notable differences between expenditure and the financing objec-
tively required. In many regions of the South, there continues to be a notable imbalance 
between the volume of resources possessed and the needs of the population (Mapelli, 
2007). To give an example, a rough indicator of this imbalance can be the number of 
beds in hospitals per thousand inhabitants: the lowest number is recorded in the South 
with 3.7 beds, compared to 4.6 in the Center and 4.5 in the North. Even the number of 
personnel employed in the National Health Service is lower here, compared to the rest 
of Italy: about one doctor and four auxiliary personnel per 1000 inhabitants compared to 
almost three doctors and six auxiliary personnel in the Center and North (Istat, 2007). 
 
However, the most striking difference is shown by the flux of patients hospital-
ized in other regions. Between 1999 and 2003, hospital inter-regional mobility increased: 
the percentage of patients hospitalized in regions different than their own increased 
from 6.7 percent to 7.1 percent. The flux of those leaving the region of residence is far 
greater in the South and the displacements are mainly to the North (in 2003, the number 
of non-resident citizens hospitalized in Lombardy amounted to 134,000) (Istat, 2005). 
 
Why this flux of people from one region to another? Since the national health 
system guarantees health care for all citizens, the inhabitants of a region with poor or 
outdated medical facilities can request medical services in regions that are wealthier and 
have better equipped medical facilities. Especially for more complex and therefore more 
costly medical procedures such as highly specialized surgery (6 percent of hospital mo-
bility is related to specialized treatment) or therapeutic treatments using state-of-the-art 
technology; therefore, there is a considerable movement of people from the Southern re-
gions to the hospitals of the Center-North (Istat, 2005). Thus, the level of per capita 
health expenditure is only apparently analogous in the three main territorial areas. In 
fact, the available data that we give in table 9 are not adjusted to take inter-regional mo-
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bility into account, as the region where the inhabitant lives transfers the corresponding 
amount to the region providing the requested medical service only at a later stage. This 
means that the per capita expenditure of the Southern regions is actually far higher than 
in the North (which consequently has to manage its own health services much more ef-
fectively since it has a larger number of users than its residents alone) and therefore 
weighs much more on the public budgets.  
 
The “state authority deficit” is particularly significant as far as pensions are con-
cerned, not so much the amounts as the number of recipients. The welfare regime in the 
South has been – and, in part, still is – characterized by patronage in the payment of pen-
sions. This has represented a hidden practice of income redistribution to the population 
in many regions of the South, along with exempting employers from paying social secu-
rity contributions (Boeri, 2000). Up to the 1980s, in the South, the “social security mar-
ket” (Ferrera, 1984) was mainly based on disability pensions (see first column in Table 
10, p. 20). In 1984, the criteria for receiving these pensions were tightened and the social 
security market shifted to civilian disability pensions (i.e., no longer based on previous 
employment, thus making it even easier to obtain such pensions) (Ferrera, 1996, 2000). 
Table 10 shows that most of these welfare pensions are paid in the South. Data on civil 
disability pensions (in parenthesis) especially show their heavy concentration in the 
South.   
 
Despite this “welfarist orientation,” Italian social expenditure can barely provide 
adequate support to the poorest part of the population (Boeri, 2000). Eurostat (2005) esti-
mates that in 2003 the risk of poverty did not significantly decrease after payment of so-
cial transfers (social security and welfare), unlike what occurs in Sweden or Denmark 
(countries where the risk of poverty decreases considerably after social transfers are 
paid). As shown in Table 11 (p. 20), most of the poor families and poor persons live in 
the South of Italy.  
 
Moreover, the socioeconomic differences between North and South are histori-
cally characterized by a labor market that is territorially segmented. Graph 1 (p. 21) 
shows the trend of unemployment rates by geographic area. We can see that these rates 
are much higher in the South than in Northern and Central Italy and also that long-term 
unemployment is heavily concentrated there: in 2004 the rate was about 8.2 percent 
compared to 1.7 percent in the North-West (Ministry of Social Solidarity). 
 
However, Graph 1 shows that since 2001 the unemployment rate has begun to 
decrease. This is mainly due to the resumption of the internal (within Italy) mobility of 
workers, although for shorter periods of time and with lower changes in residence than 
in the 1960s. What now seem to increase are the psychological costs of being uprooted. 
However, what also affects the type of internal mobility is the decrease in the number of 
available stable jobs in the areas to which people are moving. The Italian labor market is 
therefore characterized by almost full employment in the Center-North and what can be 
defined as mass unemployment in the South (Reyneri, 2005). 
 
However, the flight from unemployment was not only characterized by emi-
gration towards areas with a strong labor demand. There are two other factors that have 
historically affected the labor market in the South: the concentration of jobs in public ad-
ministration and the size of the underground economy.  
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The desire to obtain a civil service job is traditionally much higher in the South 
than in the North. This is mainly because there are fewer jobs available in the South, but 
also because more jobs in public administration have been created in the South than in 
the Center-North (Boeri, 2000). The percentage of public employees on the total work 
force is in the South almost double what it is in the North.  
 
The South has also traditionally been characterized by a large number of irregu-
lar jobs in the main sectors of the economy (while there are fewer atypical and tempo-
rary jobs compared to the Center-North): excluding public administration, almost four 
out of ten people employed have an irregular job. This deep-rooted situation is due to 
various factors: the widespread existence of small family businesses, the high rate of 
poverty, the lower educational level and lower civic pride (Reyneri 2005). 
 
The existence of different socioeconomic areas in the national territory also led to 
the spread of decentralized levels of negotiation of public policies, especially those re-
garding employment and economic development. Since the second half of the 1990s, 
alongside national tripartite negotiations, “territorial pacts” have become widespread.   
 
Territorial pacts, based on formal agreements among local governments, unions 
and employers’ organizations, and other important local actors – such as banks, univer-
sities and various private participants – are innovative forms of decentralized social dia-
logue or concertation, aimed at the consensual planning of local initiatives for economic 
and occupational development. Another form of territorial pact introduced subsequent-
ly by legislation was the so-called “area agreement,” especially targeted to less devel-
oped areas with higher unemployment, primarily, though not exclusively, in southern 
Italy. While intended to mobilize local resources, these latter agreements should have 
meant greater wage and labor-market flexibility as well; however, sharp divisions 
among the trade unions emerged on this sensitive issue.  
 
A research study carried out in 2003 by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance 
shows that, since 1997, 220 territorial pacts have been signed. The percentage of the 
population and territory covered by these pacts is higher in the South: the municipalities 
affected by the pacts cover about 80 percent of the population and territory in the South 
compared to only 30 percent in the North. Some types of pact were mainly signed in the 
South: e.g., those signed at the end of the 1990s (termed “first generation pacts”) and 
those for which the resources to support business initiatives were singled out in the bud-
get law. Others were mainly signed in the North: these were pacts for territories struck 
by natural calamities. From the financial viewpoint, the territorial pacts (especially the 
first generation ones) seem to be efficient, as payment of funds takes place rather quick-
ly. Nevertheless, they do not seem to have produced many economic and institutional 
outcomes (production of public goods, greater efficiency of administrations, consoli-
dated relationships between the signatory partners).  
 
The record of these forms of decentralized bargaining at the territorial level is, 
therefore, less impressive than was originally expected. While several case studies (Bar-
bera 2001; Regalia 2001) have shown instances of success, the overall attempt to decen-
tralize tripartism and broaden its scope has been hampered not just by divisions among 
unions and by insufficient resources provided by local institutions. More importantly, 
employers have in most cases been lukewarm participants and have generally not coop-
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erated actively to insure success. The main reason is that they have mainly regarded ter-
ritorial tripartism as yet another level of bargaining, at a time when they were becoming 
increasingly unhappy about the two-level structure of collective bargaining set up by the 
tripartite agreement of 1993.  
 
3.2. A mixed type of welfare regime 
 
A second dividing line, whose implications are far less discussed, stems from the 
coexistence of quite different principles in the various national welfare programs, name-
ly, a particularistic, occupation-based principle in such programs as pensions or unem-
ployment benefits vs. a universalistic, citizenship-based one in the provision of others, 
such as health or education. 
 
In terms of social expenditure, the former programs prevail over the latter to a 
greater extent than in other European countries. The quantitative and political salience 
of expenditure in occupation-based pension programs explains why Italy is commonly 
placed in the conservative type of welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1999). But health 
and education are not irrelevant in terms of social spending, although below the Euro-
pean average (see Table 12, p. 21), and they are provided on a universalistic basis. This 
internal inconsistency of the Italian welfare regime has some important implications that 
we will discuss in the Conclusions. 
 
Of the pensions paid out, up to 83 prcent (see Table 10 in the Appendix) go to 
people who paid contributions when they were employed. The Italian pension system is 
highly differentiated and based on occupational categories, especially as regards the 
amount of contributions and benefits respectively (Ferrera, 1996; Samek, 2000). 
 
Table 13 (p. 21) highlights the benefits/contributions ratio (also excluding purely 
welfare transfers). For private employees, public employees and artisans, shopkeepers, 
farmers, expenditure for benefits is higher than revenues from the contributions paid. 
However, for the self-employed and fixed-term collaborators, the benefits are lower than 
the contributions paid in. In fact, fixed-term collaborators (parasubordinati, meaning that 
they are formally self-employed but actually working for one employer) form a con-
tributory category created in 1996 following labor-market reform (see section 2), with 
pensions first paid in 2000. This category is therefore still evolving, mainly made up of 
persons aged 25-39 (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2007). 
 
Hence, for many years, there has been an imbalance in favor of the traditional 
components of the work force, with social expenditure for them higher than contribu-
tions paid. The current imbalance represents a serious problem, given the decrease in the 
number of workers (and therefore contributors) due to demographic and labor-market 
trends. On the one hand, there has been a decline in birthrate and, on the other, a change 
in employment rates. As the data show, in the case of artisans and farmers, not only are 
benefits higher than contributions, but the number of pensions is much higher than the 
number of contributors, since in these sectors the replacement ratio is very low due not 
only to the decrease in birthrates but also to changes in occupational choices.  
 
The Italian pension system is therefore extremely particularistic and social bene-
fits differ considerably according to occupational category. The same is true for income 
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support measures during periods of worker unemployment or reduced employment. In 
Italy, there are no unemployment benefits for the self-employed and people first enter-
ing the labor market (a minimum of “seniority” contributions are necessary). Even in 
this case, there is a high degree of fragmentation since the type of unemployment bene-
fits depends on the kind of job lost (sector and size of firm, type of contract) and the rea-
sons for dismissal (collective or individual dismissal) (Samek, 2000).  
 
The ordinary unemployment benefits for unemployed workers (regulated differ-
ently for construction and agricultural workers) are based on contributions and have re-
cently been increased to 40 percent of the previous pay and last only six months. How-
ever, in Italy, there is a form of unemployment benefits for the “partially unemployed” 
(Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, or Redundancy Fund). It is an income support measure for 
redundant workers and only applies to large companies. This tool to deal with partial 
unemployment has traditionally enjoyed high public support and is welcomed by com-
panies, since they can avail themselves of this Fund instead of having to dismiss redun-
dant workers. It is not the traditional unemployment benefit, since workers keep their 
jobs. Rather, it is a form of social protection for the “insiders” only, that we shall discuss 
in section 3.3 below. 
 
In Italy, the expenditure on unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP is far 
below the European average (see Table 12, p. 21). Italy is one of the European countries 
with the lowest income support measures for the unemployed and with a low rate of 
coverage (Reyneri, 2005). Only 22 percent of the unemployed in 2005 were covered by 
unemployment benefits (and 5.8 percent by mobility benefits). Moreover, the percentage 
of those benefitting from the Redundancy Fund have almost doubled compared to those 
receiving unemployment benefits. This demonstrates that the Redundancy Fund still 
represents an important “shock absorber,” although it only applies to specific occupa-
tional categories, thus confirming the particularistic nature of the income support meas-
ures for the unemployed. We can therefore conclude that the Italian social security sys-
tem is highly fragmented at the institutional level and in terms of coverage.   
 
However, as pointed out earlier, there are two important areas of public spend-
ing that are characterized by universalistic coverage, namely, health and education. 
Table 12 (p. 21) shows that, as a percentage of GDP, the expenditure for both is close to 
the European average, even though slightly below. The National Health Service is a 
public and universalistic system aimed at guaranteeing health care to all citizens. It was 
planned to be an entitlement and was not means-tested. Later, the financial situation 
generated pressure to introduce user charges in order to avoid waste, even if this might 
lead to inequalities, and means-testing for most medical examinations and medicines. 
However, although regulated by law, both user charges and exemptions to them were 
often not enforced, due to the inability of administrations to make citizens comply with 
the laws (Ferrera, 2000). Therefore, the health system is fundamentally characterized by 
universalistic criteria based on citizenship. For some services, such as access to hospital 
emergency wards, Italian citizenship is not even required since everyone can be treated 
free of charge.  
 
The public education system is also universalistic. Education is provided for all 
citizens, regardless of family income, and is almost free of charge. More specifically, 
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education is free and compulsory for children between six and sixteen. It includes five 
years of universal primary school, three years of universal intermediate school and two 
years of higher instruction in high schools, in professional, regionally-administered 
schools, or with a parallel work and study program as apprentices. Primary school in-
cludes book benefits, while from the age of twelve the costs of books and transport, and 
the almost symbolic fees for high schools, are charged to families, sometimes with bene-
fits from local authorities. Universities are both public and private; public universities 
are mainly financed by the State and have low, income-related fees and means-tested 
support for low-income students, while private universities (a small minority in Italian 
higher education) have much higher fees. 
 
3.3. A social model for insiders only? 
 
A third dividing line within the Italian social model has attracted less attention 
from sociologists and political scientists but has been highlighted by both economists 
and labor lawyers. A number of scholars in these fields have considered the extent to 
which different features of the Italian social model apply to different categories of work-
ers and/or citizens. Namely, a high job and income security for core workers and their 
families (the insiders) vs. a relatively high dependence on the market and on residual 
forms of welfare for the others (the outsiders). Also, trade-union strategy has been heav-
ily focused on protecting core membership and a tripartite concertation often conceived 
as an exclusive club in which the outsiders’ demands are not represented. 
 
Table 14 (p. 22) provides some data on the size of the Italian work force that we 
can consider core, in that it enjoys strong protection from the market. By enjoying 
“strong protection,” we mean that the law provides a high level of both job and income 
security to about 41 percent of the Italian workforce (the “insiders,” mostly employees in 
medium-large companies and in public administration), while about 59 percent (the 
“outsiders”) enjoys far lower security. Moreover, welfare programs that are occupation-
based, such as pensions, tend to be more generous to the insiders. Finally, trade unions 
overwhelmingly represent the interests of insiders, as well as retired workers, while the 
outsiders’ interests are only occasionally or indirectly represented. 
 
The one legal clause that provides the insiders with high job security is the (in)fa-
mous article 18 of the Statuto dei lavoratori (Workers’ Charter) passed in 1970, at the 
height of union power. This clause regulates individual dismissals in an extremely re-
strictive way. Compared to other countries, sanctions against unfair dismissals are par-
ticularly severe and widely applied. Early legislation was passed in 1966, on the basis of 
the 1965 national collective agreement. The 1970 Workers’ Charter then strengthened 
protection against unfair dismissals by extending its coverage to firms with at least six-
teen employees and by introducing more severe sanctions. In 1990 coverage was ex-
tended to all firms, although smaller ones are subject to less stringent sanctions in cases 
of unfair dismissal. These norms are extremely rigid and the procedures long and quite 
complex. Moreover, the final outcome is often uncertain since it depends on subjective 
interpretations by the labor courts concerning the existence of justified grounds for dis-
missal. The entire process from notification of dismissal to the final decision by the court 
can take up to ten years (Samek, 2000). After several failed attempts, however, the aboli-
tion of article 18 is still on the Italian political agenda. 
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As to income security for insiders, since 1947, with major reforms in 1975, cash 
benefits are provided to those workers who are temporarily laid off or who work only 
for reduced time due to temporary problems at the workplace. In this connection, the 
Redundancy Fund (Cassa integrazione guadagni) aims to help companies in financial dif-
ficulty by relieving them of the costs of unused work force, and also supporting those 
workers who risk losing part of their income. The workers receive 80 percent of their 
previous wages, under a maximum level established by law, and their contributions for 
pensions are counted as paid, even if they are not (contributi figurativi).  
 
Along with the Redundancy Fund, since 1984 companies can also apply for Soli-
darity Contracts: after a negotiation with the local trade unions, the company can estab-
lish contracts with reduced working time, in order to avoid dismissing redundant work-
ers. The state will grant those workers 60 percent of the wages lost. These contracts can 
last up to four years, five in the South. Since 1993, these Solidarity Contracts can also 
apply to companies not entitled to the Redundancy Fund. In this case, the state and the 
company each give the workers 25 percent of the wages lost, for up to two years. 
 
If the Redundancy Fund fails to help the company to recover financially, the 
workers can be entitled to mobility allowances (indennità di mobilità), if they have perma-
nent employment contracts and have been employed in the previous twelve months. 
Other companies are provided incentives to employ them. The period of mobility allow-
ance is generally up to twelve months. To remain entitled to these allowances, the work-
er is obliged to attend a training program or take on a similar job with a wage up to 90 
percent of the previous one, or communicate to the Social Security Board that he/she 
has found a temporary or part-time job. 
 
While core workers enjoy high job and income security, Italy has an unusually 
high rate of youth unemployment. One of the main causes has been the peculiar family 
regime of the Italian welfare state. Italy is the European country that spends the least on 
public policies in favor of those seeking a first-time job and the least generous in provid-
ing unemployment benefits. This situation exerts a certain pressure on those people who 
have lost their jobs. They are usually adults who are under considerable pressure to find 
a new job in order to prevent a sharp drop in the family income. In contrast, those who 
are just entering the job market are young people, still living at home. Since they can 
often count on their parents’ financial support, they have more time to look for a job. 
The competition is therefore between ex-insiders, who have to find a job as soon as pos-
sible, and outsiders, who can afford to wait.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Internal differences within the Italian social model certainly make it rather incon-
sistent, but would not per se lead to the “uneasy co-existence” which the title of our 
paper suggests. 
 
Our basic argument, however, is that the three dividing lines substantially en-
danger the legitimacy and social acceptance of what we labeled as the Italian social 
model. Each of the three contradictions that we described profoundly affects the percep-
tions of workers and citizens, leading to widespread criticism of even those aspects that 
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clearly benefit them and, at the same time and somewhat paradoxically, to fierce 
opposition to the several attempts at reforming the “Italian model.” 
  
As a conclusion to our analysis, in what follows we’ll deal briefly with this out-
come of the coexistence of different social models in Italy, namely, the loss of legitimacy 
of the overall social model, plagued by contrasting grievances and demands; a paradoxi-
cal result indeed, if one considers that the very existence of a social model is meant to in-
crease consensus and acceptance of market outcomes. This, incidentally, is likely to have 
played a major role in the recent (2008) political elections won by the center-right coali-
tion.  
 
4.1. It may not be difficult to understand why permanent, or even increasing, 
territorial differences in both the performance and the costs of the social model are in the 
long run a source of major tensions and conflicts. Residents of the areas - mostly in the 
South - that experience lower welfare standards, higher unemployment, inefficient 
mechanisms of labor-market regulation and public policymaking, come to see them-
selves as citizens deprived of their rights. They depend on state resources and policies to 
a far greater extent than residents of more economically developed areas, but, at the 
same time, they protest against the ineffectiveness of state policies and redistribution. 
 
On the other hand, residents of the wealthier and more dynamic areas resent 
having to pay high taxes to support an inefficient, often corrupt, system which provides 
benefits unrelated to contributions; a system which, furthermore, is seen to hinder the 
competitiveness of those areas by devolving the resources needed for local infrastruc-
tures to the poorer areas, without actually helping their economic development. 
 
4.2. It may be more difficult to see why the co-existence of a particularistic, 
occupation-based principle in pensions and unemployment benefits and a universalistic, 
citizenship-based one in the provision of health and education should have any impact 
on the perceived legitimacy of the Italian social model. Actually, the Italian welfare state 
began to be built along the lines of the corporatist-conservative model, or of its Mediter-
ranean variant. However, in the 1970s, increases in public spending and a major focus 
on universality brought it on the same path as social-democratic regimes. These policies 
proved to be financially unsustainable, as public debt and inflation grew threateningly, 
and in the 1990s efforts at decentralization and privatization were carried on in order to 
cope with European pressures for economic stability. But the “seed” (so to speak) of uni-
versalistic coverage, namely the idea of a full social citizenship, remained deeply en-
trenched, forging citizens’ attitudes and especially interest associations’ strategies. To 
the extent that political rhetoric and public discourse are important instruments in the 
struggle for legitimacy and social acceptance, it is worth noting that two out of the three 
Italian labor confederations have made the explicit choice to redefine themselves as 
defenders of citizenship rights.  
 
First came UIL, the third largest trade union in Italy, which some twenty years 
ago adopted the new slogan of a “citizens’ union.” Even more significant was the choice 
made by CGIL (the largest confederation) in its 1991 national congress, then reaffirmed in 
the following conventions, to change into a sindacato dei diritti (literally, a union for 
rights), in implicit opposition to the traditional role of any trade union to pursue (work-
ers’) interests. Whether these choices were just value options at a rhetorical-symbolic 
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level, as several commentators maintained, or actual strategic decisions with practical 
consequences, they would have been unthinkable in a welfare regime exclusively per-
meated by a corporatist, occupation-based logic.  
 
More importantly, they contributed to the widespread feeling that the specific 
forms of social protection historically achieved by legislation or by collective bargaining 
should be conceived as “rights” or entitlements, and as such non-negotiable and en-
forceable irrespective of changing power relations. It is this largely shared view, or per-
haps ideology, which has shaped much of the diffuse opposition to labor-market and 
welfare reforms in Italy and which has proved especially resistant to changes in its social 
model more generally. 
 
4.3. Lastly, the unfairness of a social model providing almost exclusive represen-
tation, as well as high job and income security, only to core workers and their families 
(the insiders), while leaving the outsiders largely unprotected, has contributed to its loss 
of legitimacy. On the one hand, trade unions and tripartite concertation (two pillars of 
the Italian social model) fell easily under attack for this reason. Italian trade unions had, 
at least from the time of the “struggle for social reforms” in late 1960s, traditionally 
voiced support of “general interests” over particularistic demands. The later adoption of 
a strategy in favor of citizenship rights that we just described was in a sense a logical de-
velopment of this ideology. Yet such an ideology stood in sharp contrast to the concrete, 
daily action for the defense of insiders’ interests. This led to conflicts inside the unions 
and to a general decrease in their acceptance by public opinion. 
 
On the other hand, the view according to which the Italian social model was de-
signed to protect insiders at the expense of outsiders, advanced by several economists 
with the aim of increasing its fairness (e.g. Bertola and Ichino, 1995), was often used in 
public debate as a powerful argument for cutting welfare provisions, weakening trade 
unions and rejecting tripartite concertation. 
 
To conclude, the internal differences in the Italian social model that we highlight 
do not just lead to its fragmentation and low effectiveness. More importantly, they en-
danger its legitimacy and social acceptance. In fact, one rather neglected consequence of 
these differences is to affect the perceptions of workers and citizens, leading to an often 
paradoxical mix of severe criticism of the shortcomings of the Italian social model and of 
fierce opposition to most attempts at reforming it. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Social expenditure as a % of GDP 
 
 1960 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Italy 16.8 18.2 24.0 24.7 24.9 25.3 25.8 26.0 26.4 
France  20.8 27.3 29.5 29.6 30.4 30.9 31.3 31.5 
Germany 20.4 23.8 25.4 29.3 29.4 30.0 30.3 29.6 29.4 
Spain  15.5 19.9 20.3 20.0 20.3 20.4 20.6 20.8 
Sweden 15.4 28.6 33.1 30.7 31.2 32.2 33.2 32.7 32.0 
UK 13.9 16.6 22.8 26.9 27.3 26.2 26.2 26.3 26.8 
EU-15 : 21.9 24.4 27.0 27.1 27.4 27.8 27.7 27.8 
Sources: OECD (1985); Eurostat (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. General government gross public debt as a % of GDP 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Italy 121.2 120.6 118.1 114.9 113.7 109.1 108.7 105.6 104.3 103.8 106.2 106.8 
France 55.5. 58.0 59.2 59.4 58.9 57.3 56.9 58.8 62.9 64.9 66.7 64. 2 
Germany 55.6. 58.4 59.7 60.3 60.9 59.7 58.8 60.3 63.8 65.6 67. 8 67.5 
Spain 62.7. 66.8 65.3 63.2 61.5 59.3 55.5 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.7 
Sweden 73.1. 73.9 71.8 70.0 65.6 54.4 55.3 53.7 53.5 52.4 52.2 47.0 
UK 50.6. 50.8 49.4 46.3 43.6 41.0 37.7 37.5 38.7 40.4 42.1 43.2 
EU - 15  : : : : : 63.2 62.2 61.6 63.0 63.3 64.2 63.0 
      Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Taxes as a % of GDP 
 Italy EU-15 
 1995 2000 2007 1995a 2000 2007 
Taxes (as % of GDP) 26.8 29.2 29.9 25.7 26.2 26.3 
. Indirect taxes 11.8 14.7 14.7 13.3 13.3 13.5 
. Direct taxes 14.5 14.4 15.2 12.1 12.7 12.5 
. Capital taxes 0.6 <0.1 <0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Social contributions (as % of GDP) 14.4 12.4 13.3 16.1 15.8 15.2 
Implicit tax rate on labor 37.8 43.4 43.0b 38.2 39.6 39.0b 
a. Data refers to 1998 (except for Implicit tax rate which refers to 1995) 
b. Data refers to 2006 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 4. Indicators of economic performance (Italy 1977-2007). 
INDICATORS 1977 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
GDP (% variation) 2.3 2.9 0.7 2.0 0.3 1.4 
Import of goods and services  (% var.) 1.7 11.1 4.7 10.1 -0.8 4.2 
Export of goods and services  (% var.) 8.2 4.5 6.5 6.2 -3.0 5.2 
Gross fixed investments (% var.) 2.7 4.2 -1.4 2.1 1.2 1.2 
Households consumptions (%var:) 4.0 3.4 1.3 3.3 0.0 1.3 
Added value (whole economy - var. %) 2.2 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.4 1.5 
Unemployment rate  7.2 12.0 11.6 11.3 8.6 7.8 
Employment rate  54.4 52.6 53.1 52.3 56.7 58.7 
Income from work per employee (var. %) 20.5 7.8 5.7 4.0 2.5 1.9 
Gross pay per employee (var.%) 24.9 8.5 5.1 3.4 2.5 2.1 
Labor cost per product unit (1995=100)  73.9 98.4 106.1 112.1 119.4 
Real inflation rate 
  5.2 2.0 2.5 2.1 
Hourly bargained wage (whole economy - % var.) 
  4.6 4.4 2.1 2.3 
Hourly actual wage (whole economy - % var.) 
  5.2 3.4 2.6 2.3 
Sources: our elaboration on Istat, Rapporto annuale 2004-2007; OECD; De Novellis. Origo. Vignocchi (2002); 
Cnel (2004, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Trade union density in Europe 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2001 2002 
Italy 24.7 37.0 49.6 38.8 34.9 34.8 34.0 
France 19.6 21.7 18.3 10.1 9.7 9.6 .. 
Germany  34.7 32.0 34.9 31.2 25.0 23.5 23.2 
Spain     14.7 13.9 .. .. 
UK    39.3  30.7 30.4 
Sweden 70.7 67.7 78.0 80.0 79.1 78.0 78.0 
EU-15       32.8 28.5a 27.3 .. 
a. it refers to 1999 
Sources: Visser (2005); OECD (various years) 
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Table 6. Social pacts in Italy 1980s-2000s 
 
1983: incomes policy 
1984: incomes policy (no CGIL) 
1992: abolition of wage-indexation 
1993: reform of collective bargaining 
1995: pensions reform (no Confindustria) 
1996: labor market flexibility 
1998: symbolic 
2002: labor market flexibility (no CGIL) 
2007: social security 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
  Regular employment Temporary employment 
Collective 
dismissals Overall EPL 
  late '80s late '90s 2003 late '80s late '90s 2003 late '90s 2003 late '90s 2003 
UK 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.9 2.9 1.0 1.1 
Ireland 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.3 
Denmark 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.1 1.4 1.4 3.9 3.9 1.8 1.8 
Finland 2.8 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Austria 2.9 2.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.2 
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 1.2 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 
Italy 1.8 1.8 1.8 5.4 3.6 2.1 4.9 4.9 3.1 2.4 
Belgium 1.7 1.7 1.7 4.6 2.6 2.6 4.1 4.1 2.5 2.5 
Germany 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.8 2.3 1.8 3.5 3.8 2.6 2.5 
Sweden 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.1 1.6 1.6 4.5 4.5 2.6 2.6 
Greece 2.5 2.3 2.4 4.8 4.8 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 2.9 
France 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.6 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.9 
Spain 3.9 2.6 2.6 3.8 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 
Portugal 4.8 4.3 4.4 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004 
 
 
 
Table 8. Breakdown of social spending in Italy by welfare program (2005) 
  Millions of euros % of the total % of GDP 
Social Security 252,316 66.7 17.1 
Health 95,158 25.2 7.3 
Public assistance 30,834 8.2 2.0 
Total 378,308 100.0 26.4 
       Source: Istat 
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Table 9. Breakdown of health expenditure in Italy by geographic area (2005) 
 Spending per capita 
National Health Service 
(% of total health 
expenditure) 
North 1,594 37.82 
Center 1,756 37.46 
South 1,590 42.40 
ITALY 1,624 39.33 
         Source: Istat 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. % pensions paid by type and geographic area (2005) 
 Old age, seniority, 
survivors 
Occupational illness, accidents Public welfare  
(civilian disability pensions) 
North 51.3 44.1 31.5 
Center 20.3 24.2 17.4 
South 28.4 31.7 51.0 
ITALY 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Istat 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Distribution of poor persons (relative poverty) by geographic area (2006) 
 North Center South ITALY 
poor persons 
(millions) 
1,447 889 5,201 7,537 
total persons 
(millions) 
26,458 11,244 20,669 58,371 
% poor 5.5 7.9 25.2 12.9 
Source: Istat 
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Graph 1. Unemployment rate by geographic area (1993-2007). 
 
Source: Istat. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Social expenditure by welfare program as % of GDP (2005). 
  Italy EU-15 
Pensions 14.0 12.0 
Unemployment benefits  0.5 1.7 
Health 6.8 7.7 
Education 4.4 4.8 
     Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Pensions by occupational category (2006). 
 Private 
employees 
Public 
employees 
 
Artisans, 
farmers, 
shopkeepers 
Self-employed 
professionals 
Fixed-term 
collaborators 
Benefits/ 
Contributions ratio 
102.5 98.9 129.9 54.8 2.6 
No. pensions/ 
No. contributors ratio 
80.9 74.4 105.5 25.8 6.7 
Source:  Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2007) 
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Table 14 . Size of the Italian work force enjoying “strong protection” from the market (2005) 
 
Italian workforce        24.451.000 
 Unemployed          1.888.000 
         _________ 
 Employed       22.563.000 
 Irregular and undeclared workers      2.538.000 
         _________ 
 Regular employees      20.025.000 
 Regular self-employed        5.560.000 
         _________ 
 Regular dependent employee     14.465.000 
 Dependent employees of private firms < 15 employeesa     3.197.000 
         _________ 
Workers who enjoy “strong protection”     10.148.000 
a. Drawn from 2001 census of industry and services 
Sources: Ichino (1996); Istat (2005) 
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